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Comment
Equal Athletic Opportunity: An Analysis of Mercer v.
Duke University and a Proposal To Amend the Contact
Sport Exception to Title IX
Abigail Crouse*
Heather Mercer was an all-state kicker who helped lead
her high-school football team to a state championship.' Several
coaches who worked with Mercer regarded her skills as com-
petitive to those of any kicker playing at the collegiate Division
One level. 2 After graduation, she attended Duke University
where she was a walk-on player on the school's football team.3
Because she was female, however, she was not treated like
most of the walk-ons.4 The coaches gave her a private try-out,
and she was only allowed to practice with the other walk-on
kickers (all of whom were male) even though the other walk-on
kickers were allowed to practice with the full team.5 She was
not issued a uniform, nor was she allowed to dress for games.6
Despite this discrimination, she was still able to demonstrate
her remarkable skills. In the team's spring intrasquad match,
Mercer kicked the twenty-eight-yard winning field goal for her
team, and the coach told her she had made the Duke Univer-
sity team.7 Nonetheless, the discrimination continued the fol-
lowing year. Even though she was a member of the team, the
* J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1998,
University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. See Timothy W. Smith, A Kicker Sues, Saying She Was Treated Un-
fairly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at C1. See generally Mercer v. Duke Univ.,
190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. See Smith, supra note 1, at C1.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id. While the other walk-on kickers sat on the field with the team,
the coach told Mercer she could sit in the stands with her boyfriend during
home games. See id.
7. See id.
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coach told her she would be a distraction to the other players if
she were allowed to dress in uniform and stand on the side-
line.8 The coach later told her she had no place on the team.9
In many areas of American law, the last century has wit-
nessed the deterioration of legally enforceable gender roles. 10
Since 1971, the Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that
gender based "classifications may not be used, as they once
were,.., to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women."11 Congress has also taken steps to pro-
vide equal opportunity to women, passing legislation such as
Title IX of the Educational Amendments. 12
Despite the gains made by legislative and judicial efforts,
Heather Mercer's situation demonstrates that legal reform is
still needed to combat some types of gender discrimination.
Congress promulgated Title IX with the hope that it would pro-
vide women with equal opportunity.13 The sexual prejudice en-
grained in our society, however, may have blinded the founders
of Title IX to the fact that their efforts to alleviate gender-based
discrimination also perpetuated it. 14 This Comment will argue
that the contact sport exception to Title IX, which permits gen-
der-based discrimination in contact sports, denies equal ath-
8. See id. Ironically, the Duke football coach asked Mercer to conduct
interviews with news media about being the only female kicker on a Division I
football team, even though he refused to let her dress for games. See id.
9. See id.
10. Until 1920, women did not have the right to vote, see U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX (passed 1920), were discouraged from pursuing an education, and
could legally be treated as a man's inferior. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464, 467 (1948) (rejecting challenges to a Michigan law denying women the
right to have bartender licenses unless they were the wife or the daughter of a
male tavern owner). Women were thought of as weak and in need of men's
help and care. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN
(1869). However, in 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when one of its
laws or official state policies "denies to women, simply because they are
women, full citizenship stature-equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, partici-
pate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and capaci-
ties." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
11. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534.
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994); see also infra text accompanying note 19.
13. See generally 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972).
14. See 118 CONG. REC. 5811 (1972) (report by Dr. Bernice Sandler titled
"The Status of Women: Employment and Admissions") ("Sex discrimination is
the last socially acceptable prejudice. Sex prejudice is so engrained in our so-
ciety that many who practice it are simply unaware that they are hurting
women.").
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letic opportunity to men and women and solidifies traditional
gender roles.
Part I of this Comment examines the origins of Title IX
and the contact sports exception as well as the current state of
the law. Part II describes the district court's dismissal of Mer-
cer's claim and the Fourth Circuit's reversal of that decision in
Mercer v. Duke University. 15 Part III articulates the superiority
of the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the contact sport excep-
tion. This Part also examines weaknesses in the Fourth Cir-
cuit's interpretation, noting that even the best interpretation of
the contact sport exception creates problems of application.
Part IV proposes the elimination of the contact sport exception
and the creation of new regulatory language that will ensure
equal athletic opportunity.
I. CURRENT REMEDIES FOR GENDER
DISCRIMINATION IN ATHLETICS
Many students are denied the opportunity to play their
sport of choice because their school only offers one team, lim-
ited to members of the opposite sex. Such students may have
two federal remedies: an action under Title IX or an action un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Title IX is the most widely available of
these remedies and is specifically designed to deal with dis-
crimination in educational programs.
A. TITLE IX PROVIDES A REMEDY FOR GENDER-BASED
DISCRIMINATION IN ATHLETICS
Congress passed Title IX of the Educational Amendments
of 1972 in response to abundant evidence of widespread aca-
demic discrimination against women.16 The legislation was
modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
banned race discrimination in federally funded programs. 17
Through Title IX, Congress intended "to put into law 'the es-
sential guarantees of equal opportunity in education.'"'18 The
15. 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999).
16. In the summer of 1970, the House Special Subcommittee on Education
held hearings on sex discrimination that went on to serve as the basis for Title
IX legislation. See generally 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972).
17. See Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 533 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(stating that Title IX was "intended to provide appropriate safeguards 'parallel
to those found in Title VI" (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (remarks of
Senator Bayh))).
18. See id. (quoting 118 CONGREC. 5808 (remarks of Senator Bayh)).
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Act provides that "no person.., on the basis of sex, shall be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance."' 9 Two years
later, Congress amended Title IX in the Educational Amend-
ments of 1974 to make the statute applicable to athletic pro-
grams.20 It authorized the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare2 ' to promulgate regulations for implementing Title
IX that included "with respect to intercollegiate athletic activi-
ties reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular
sports."2 2 In early summer of 1975, the agency issued a final
version of its regulations.23
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
20. See Provision Relating to Sex Discrimination, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88
Stat. 612 (1974). The issue of Title IX's applicability to athletics was barely
mentioned in the debates surrounding passage of the original Title IX legisla-
tion. Among the few references to athletics, the sponsor of the legislation did
note that Title IX would not mandate the desegregation of football. See 117
CONG. REC. 30,407 (1971) (statement of Senator Bayh). Senator Bayh stated:
[Nior do I feel [Title IXI mandates the desegregation of football fields.
What we are trying to do is provide equal access for women and men
students to the educational process and the extracurricular activities
in a school, where there is not a unique facet such as football in-
volved. We are not requiring that intercollegiate football be desegre-
gated ....
Id.
21. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was charged with
writing the regulations, however, that Department was later split into smaller
entities. The Department of Education now administers Title IX. To help
provide continuity, this Comment will refer to the administrative agency as
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare rather than referring to
both agencies.
22. Provisions Relating to Sex Discrimination, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88
Stat. 612 (1974). This language presented a compromise to a much more far-
reaching amendment proposed by Senator Tower. Senator Tower first pro-
posed that all intercollegiate athletics be exempt from the requirements of Ti-
tle IX, but later modified his proposal to exempt only "intercollegiate ath-
letic[s] to the extent that such activity does or may provide gross receipts or
donations to the institution necessary to support that activity." 120 CONG
REC. 15,322-23 (1974) (statement of Sen. Tower). Senator Tower and many
others feared that Title IX could totally upset intercollegiate athletics, de-
priving universities of important revenue and depriving men and women of
certain opportunities, all in the name of gender equity. See id. This amend-
ment was criticized for focusing too closely on the financial burdens Title IX
would impose to guarantee gender equity. See generally Prohibition of Sex
Discrimination, 1975: Hearings on S. 2106 Before the Subcomm. on Educ. of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 94th Cong. (1975). Some critics
noted that "such an amendment to Title IX would help perpetuate the very in-
equities that the law was enacted to eliminate .... The Tower Bill would per-
petuate years of past discrimination in sports by allowing it to occur whenever
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The Department of Health, Education and Welfare's regu-
lations follow the congressional mandate of equal athletic op-
portunity, stating: "No person shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, be treated
differently from another person, or otherwise be discriminated
against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramu-
ral athletics offered by a recipient. 24 The regulations further
state that recipients can offer separate teams for members of
each sex,2 but must provide equal athletic opportunity for
members of both sexes.26 The regulations also provided a
three-year transition period for compliance with the regula-
tions.27 The Department of Health, Education and Welfare re-
money is involved." Id. at 61 (testimony of the United States National Stu-
dent Association). For a further discussion of the Tower amendment, see
Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long
Road Toward Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POLVY 51, 54 (1996).
23. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and
Activities Receiving or Benefiting from Financial Assistance, 40 Fed. Reg.
24,128 (1975). Congress had 45 days to disapprove the final regulations by
concurrent resolution. See Brake & Catlin, supra note 22, at 56. Opponents to
equal opportunity in athletics proposed several amendments to the regula-
tions, but none of these bills passed. The regulations went into effect on July
21, 1975. See id.
24. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (1999) [hereinafter "anti-discrimination clause"].
25. See id. § 106.41(b) ("[A] recipient may operate or sponsor separate
teams for members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon
competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport.") [hereinafter
"separate teams exception"].
26. See id. § 106.41(c) ("A recipient which operates or sponsors interscho-
lastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic
opportunity for members of both sexes."). The regulation goes on to list sev-
eral factors that should be considered in deciding whether a recipient has met
the requirement of equal athletic opportunity. See id. However, this provision
of the regulation allows recipients to spend more money on teams for one sex
than it does on teams for another sex. "Unequal aggregate expenditures for
members of each sex or unequal expenditures for male and female teams will
not constitute noncompliance with this section." Id. However, "the Assistant
Secretary may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for teams for
one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of each sex." Id.
This exception seems to reflect Senator Tower's concern that Title IX not de-
stroy intercollegiate football. See supra note 22.
27. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d) ("A recipient which operates or sponsors in-
terscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics at the secondary or
post-secondary school level shall comply fully with this section as expedi-
tiously as possible but in no event later than three years from the effective
date of this regulation."). The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
recognized the huge disparities that existed between men's and women's ath-
letic programs and accordingly gave schools and universities a limited period
of time to reform their programs. See id. The agency also recognized that
20001 1659
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ceived many comments after issuing the proposed regulations28
and, as a result, issued a Policy Interpretation to make the
regulations easier to understand. 29 The Policy Interpretation
provides a detailed set of factors and standards for determining
whether recipients have complied with Title IX, including eq-
uity in scholarships, resources and facilities. 30
Based on this foundation, Title IX seemed poised to readily
effectuate Congress's goal of equal athletic opportunity in the
early 1980s. 31 Indeed, it had already achieved significant gains
elementary schools were not in need of such a lengthy adjustment period. "A
recipient which operates or sponsors... athletics at the elementary school
level shall comply fully with this section... in no event later than one year
from the effective date of this regulation." Id.
28. Former Department of Health Education and Welfare Secretary Cas-
par Weinberger stated, "I had not realized until the comment period [on the
Title IX regulations] that athletics is the single most important thing in the
United States." Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 536 n.9 (E.D. Pa.
1981). "Representative Patricia Schroeder testified that she was 'shocked by
the hysteria that has surrounded these regulations, especially those relating
to sports and athletic programs." Id. at 536 (quoting Hearings on Title IXBe-
fore the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 94th Cong. 97 (1975) (statement of Rep. Schroeder)). She further
stated that "[tihe specter of that sacrosanct institution, big time football, dying
at the height of its glory, of football heroes in tattered uniforms playing to
half-empty stadiums, are alarmist tactics that serve only to cloud the issue."
Id.
29. See 44 Fed. Reg. 58,070-76 (1978) (noting that the agency intended the
Policy Interpretation to "provide a framework within which those complaints
can be resolved and to provide institutions of higher education with additional
guidance on the requirements of' compliance with Title IX).
30. See id. These factors and standards also included comparisons of par-
ticipant interest and abilities, and equity in equipment, travel, tutoring,
coaching, and recruiting. See id. The Policy Interpretation also provides in-
formation and documentation on past and present discrimination against
women. See id. It has played an important role in the courts as plaintiffs try
to force schools to comply with Title IX because it is the clearest statement of
the agency's interpretation of the regulatory criteria of the statute. Conse-
quently, courts grant it substantial deference. See, e.g., Kelley v. Board of
Trustees, 832 F. Supp. 237, 242 (C.D. IlM. 1993) ("[Ihe Court must give defer-
ence to regulations and interpretations promulgated under the authority of
Congress.").
31. This goal was based both on the notion that women and men should
be treated equally and in recognition of the health, psychological, and socio-
logical benefits of women's participation in athletics. Women who participate
in athletics are more likely to finish school, more likely to go to college, less
likely to have an unwanted pregnancy and less likely to use drugs. See, e.g.,
145 CONG. REC. H6396 (daily ed. July 26, 1999) (statement of Rep. Morella).
Furthermore, proponents argue that women who participate in sports lower
their risk of breast cancer, are less likely to suffer from depression, and have a
healthier body image. See id.
1660 [Vol. 84:1655
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for women-by 1976, just four years after the passage of Title
IX, over two million girls were participating in sports.32 This
was an increase of 600%.33 In 1984, however, the Supreme
Court halted the progress Title IX had made toward eliminat-
ing gender discrimination in athletics. The Court declared that
Title IX was "program specific" and therefore applied only to
individual programs that received federal funds.34 Although
most educational institutions receive and depend on federal
funding at the institutional level, few receive funding specifi-
cally for their sports programs;35 thus, this holding effectively
removed gender-based discrimination in athletics from Title
IX's purview. The Court's decision led to a sudden weakening
of government efforts to ensure gender equality in athletics. 36
In response to the Court's action, Congress immediately
sought to re-extend Title IX's application to athletics by
changing Title IX's definition of "program or activity."37 Con-
gress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 over a
presidential veto and specified that the term "program or ac-
32. See Jessica E. Jay, Women's Participation in Sports: Four Feminist
Perspectives, 7 TEM. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (1997) (citing Joan O'Brien, The Un-
level Playing Field, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 4, 1994, at A9).
33. See id.
34. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 572-74 (1984).
35. See Jay, supra note 32, at 5; see also Brake & Catlin, supra note 22, at
57-59.
36. See Brake & Catlin, supra note 22, at 58-59. The decision had sub-
stantial effects on the Department of Education's enforcement of Title IX ac-
tion. See id. The agency's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) immediately dropped
or narrowed 40 pending Title IX cases and suspended cases where the agency
had found discrimination and was monitoring enforcement. See id. The
agency began to ignore the numerous complaints about discrimination in ath-
letics that flowed into the office on a daily basis. See id. Because the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the law is final, this decision halted any further prog-
ress in the courts. See id.
37. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994); Brake & Catlin, supra note 22, at 59. In
1988, most members of Congress felt strongly that Title IX should apply to
athletics. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. 247 (1988) (statement of Sen. Packwood)
("Prior to the [Grove City] case, everyone... thought that the Title IX regula-
tions meant institution wide coverage. And this, very frankly, is how we fi-
nally were able to get universities and.., high schools, to give equal treat-
ment to women in athletics. This was the opening wedge."). Congressional
debates revealed a strong majority of congressional members thought that dis-
crimination against female athletes was a significant problem and deserved a
civil rights remedy. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. 25,602 (1984) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) ("I personally do not know of any Senator in the Senate-there may be
a few, but very few-who does not want title IX implemented so as to continue
to encourage women throughout America to develop into Olympic ath-
letes ....").
20001 1661
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tivity" encompasses "all of the operations of... a college, uni-
versity, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of
higher education... any part of which is extended Federal fi-
nancial assistance."38
After passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act, Title IX
regained momentum. In 1992, the Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs in a Title IX case have the right to monetary damages
in addition to the right to force compliance with the statute.39
This decision gave athletes greater incentive to sue, thereby
motivating schools to bring their athletic programs into compli-
ance with the statute.40 Several recent appellate court deci-
sions have further protected women's athletics by holding that
schools discriminating on the basis of gender in the allocation
of resources or in participation opportunities are liable under
Title IX.41 In addition, congressional support for the legislation
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1687. Congressional findings clearly stated their intent
for the new statute to overrule the Supreme Court's decision. "[Clertain as-
pects of recent decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court have unduly nar-
rowed or cast doubt upon the broad application of [T]itle IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972... legislative action is necessary to restore the prior
consistent and long-standing executive branch interpretation and broad, insti-
tution-wide application of those laws as previously administered." Pub. L. No.
100-259, § 2, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). The Supreme Court has not taken any cases
challenging the applicability of Title IX to athletics since the 1987 Act, even
denying certiori in the recent controversial case of Cohen v. Brown University,
101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997) (holding that
Brown University violated Title IX by demoting women's varsity gymnastics
and volleyball to donor-funded status).
39. See Franklin v. Gwinett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992).
Until Franklin, plaintiffs bringing Title IX suits could only seek a court order
forcing the school to comply with a law. See Brake & Catlin, supra note 22, at
60-61.
40. See Brake & Catlin, supra note 22, at 60-61. Because the plaintiffs
were students, they would often graduate before any changes would be made,
minimizing their incentive to sue under the law before the decision to allow
money damages. See id.
41. See generally Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996); Fa-
via v. Indiana Univ., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd.
of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993). In these cases, the appellate courts
held that it is a violation of Title IX for post-secondary institutions to elimi-
nate certain women's intercollegiate teams or deprive them of varsity status if
women are underrepresented in the institution's athletic programs. See
Cohen, 101 F.3d at 180; Favia, 7 F.3d at 342-44; Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831-32.
The courts rejected the defense that financial problems compelled the univer-
sity to cut funding to the women's team and insisted on substantial propor-
tionality, where each gender is entitled to equal representation in the schools
athletic programs. See Cohen, 101 F.3d at 176; Favia, 7 F.3d at 342-44; Rob-
erts, 998 F.2d at 830.
[Vol. 84:16551662
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remains overwhelmingly strong.42 In 1994, Congress took
strides to further increase Title D's effectiveness by passing
the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act.43 The Act requires that
schools publish data on athletic opportunities available to men
and women so that female athletes can determine which insti-
tution best suits their needs.44
As a result of Title IX and recent judicial decisions inter-
preting the statute, women's athletics have prospered. Only
one in twenty-seven girls participated in high school sports in
1971, but by 1994 that number had risen to one in three.45 Two
years after Title IX was passed, an estimated 50,000 men and
50 women received athletic scholarships to go to college.46 To-
day women receive about one third of the available athletic
scholarships. 47 Moreover, Title IX, combined with Olympic
competition, has helped to prompt an increased emphasis on
women's athletics worldwide. 48
42. Many members of Congress as well as outside commentators have
commended the legislation. Senator Reid stated, "Title IX has been an out-
standing program. It has allowed women to build their athleticism just as
men did for many decades." 145 CONG. REC. S8206 (daily ed. July 12, 1999).
Some members of the public and Congress have reacted negatively to the law's
growth, but their reactionary tendencies are far outweighed by supporters of
the legislation. For instance, Rep. Hastert has twice proposed eliminating
funding for Title IX enforcement and both proposals failed. See Jackie
Koszczuk, Gender Equity in Sports: Will Hastert Go to the Mat?, 57 CONG. Q
WKLY. 745, 746 (1999). Moreover, in 1998, Rep. Hastert, concerned with the
effect Title IX has on men's low revenue sports like wrestling, proposed an
amendment that would require that colleges publicly give advance notice of
their intention to drop a sport. See id. Several critics attacked the bill as an
encroachment on Title IX and it was defeated by a strong majority, 292-129.
See id. Rep. McKeon, who is also concerned with the effect Title IX has had on
men's sports, noted that support for women's athletics is strong. See id. "The
attitude [is] if men's sports are dropped, that's tough." Id.
43. Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 360B, 108 Stat. 3969, 3969-71 (1994).
44. See id. Schools must provide a listing of varsity teams, number of
participants, whether the coach is full or part-time and the coach's gender, the
number and gender of assistant coaches, salaries for coaches, total operating
expenses and total financial aid available. See id.
45. See Jay, supra note 32, at 6.
46. See 145 CONG. REC. S8206 (daily ed. July 12, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Reid).
47. See id. Senator Reid commented that it is good that women receive
one third of all athletic scholarships, but "[ilt should be half." However, "a
third is certainly a step in the right direction." Id.
48. See Jere Longman, How the Women Won, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 23,
1996, at 23, 24 ("The global triumph of women in sports has a distinctly made-
in-American flavor. Its roots reach back to the Administration of that old-
fashioned statist-liberal Richard Nixon. He signed the 1972 legislation that
20001 1663
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Not only are women playing sports, but the public is
watching. In the opening game of the women's World Cup Soc-
cer Competition at Giants Stadium in New Jersey, more fans
watched the American women defeat Denmark than have ever
watched a Giants or Jets National Football League game at
that stadium.49 Furthermore, women have become a key audi-
ence in sports programming. In covering the 1996 Summer
Olympics, NBC found that "what makes or breaks coverage is
the ability to hold women."50
B. A GOAL YET To BE OBTAINED: THE WEAKNESSES OF TITLE
IX AND § 1983 IN ESTABLISHING GENDER EQUITY
Notwithstanding the significant progress Title IX has ef-
fected, there is still no comprehensive remedy for gender dis-
crimination in athletics. Title IX creates a statutory cause of
action for gender discrimination by institutions receiving fed-
eral funding,51 and § 1983 provides a more general remedy for
discrimination by state actors.52 However, the contact sport ex-
ception to Title IX prevents many plaintiffs from obtaining Ti-
tle IX relief.53 Furthermore, confusion about the preclusive ef-
fect of Title IX denies many plaintiffs the more general remedy
available under § 1983.54
1. The History and Effect of the Contact Sport Exception to
Title IX
Despite significant gains in recent years, gender-based dis-
crimination in athletics still exists55 and, in some cases, it is
mandated athletic equality at American universities, ultimately touching off a
worldwide recruiting war for female athletic talent.").
49. See S. Res. 141, 106th Cong. (1999).
50. Longman, supra note 48, at 23 (quoting Peter C. Diamond, NBC's
senior vice president for Olympic Programming).
51. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
53. See infra Part I.B.1.
54. See infra Part I.B.2. Moreover, § 1983 is limited to actions against
state schools, because a state actor must be involved to trigger its remedy.
55. See Tarik El-Bashir, Title IX Study: Equity Is Still a Decade Away,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 29, 1997, at B13 (noting that according to a report by the
NCAA, women's collegiate athletics are about 10 years away from achieving
total equality with men's sports). "Any progress is good progress, but it is
disheartening to see that 25 years since Title IX, how slow the progress in this
area is.'" Id. (quoting Patricia Viverito, the chair of the NCAA committee on
women's athletics). In a study of 305 schools with major athletic programs,
the institutions spent $407 million on men's sports and $137 million on
1664 [Vol. 84:1655
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even sanctioned by Title IX.56 The Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare regulations allow an exception to Title IX's
broad mandate of gender equality in athletics,57 if the school
operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of one
sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members of the other
sex,... members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try out for
the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport."'
The regulation goes on to define contact sports as, "boxing,
wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other
sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily
contact."59 The Policy Interpretation clarifies that, "[iun the
women's athletics in the 1995-96 school year. See id.
Rep. Reid's salutation to the U.S. women's soccer team provides an exam-
ple of the pervasiveness of the gender inequalities that still exist in sports. He
referred to Mia Hamm, one of the stars of the team, as a female Michael Jor-
don. See 145 Cong. Rec. S8205-06 (daily ed. July 12, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Reid). Despite the fact that Rep. Reid's compliments indicate how far women's
athletics have come, this Comment demonstrates that female athletes are still
compared to and considered second-best to male athletes.
A major feature of the current debate surrounding Title IX is the effect
the law has on football. Because of football's popularity and perceived superi-
ority over other sports, many recipients have refused to fully enforce Title IX
when such enforcement would result in cutbacks to the football program. The
average college football team consists of 117 students. See Malcolm Moran,
Title IX Is Now an Irresistible Force, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1992, § 8, at 1.
Since so many men have an opportunity to play on a football team, adminis-
trators claim it is not fair to count the participants for the purposes of Title IX
because no other sport needs this many players. See id. However, profes-
sional football teams have significantly fewer players (about 50). See id.
Donna Lopiano, executive Director of the Women's Sport Foundation, consid-
ers this refusal an indication that many administrators believe that the high
revenues produced by football justify breaking the law. See id. ("We're giving
scholarships to tackling dummies.... Are we saying it's more important to
give a full scholarship to a tackling dummy than it is the first-string women's
soccer player for the team you don't have? God forbid you should take the
tackling dummy's opportunity away. It's crazy.").
56. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1999) (allowing recipients of federal aid to
operate separate teams for each gender). Although this Comment focuses on
discrimination when separate teams for both genders do not exist, there is
abundant evidence that separate teams do not provide equal athletic opportu-
nity. See Virginia P. Corudace & Steven A. Desmarais, Note, Where the Boys
Are: Can Separate Be Equal in School Sports?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1425, 1460-
64 (1985); Tracy J. Johnson, Comment, Throwing Like A Girl: Constitutional
Implications of Title IX Regarding Gender Discrimination in High School Ath-
letic Programs, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 575, 591-97 (1998); Dana Robinson,
Comment, A League of Their Own: Do Women Want Sex-Segregated Sports?, 9
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 321, 339-40 (1998).
57. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
58. Id. [hereinafter the "contact sport exception"].
59. Id.
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selection of sports, the regulation does not require institutions
to integrate their teams nor to provide exactly the same choice
of sports to men and women."60 This Policy Interpretation and
agency regulations have been granted substantial deference by
the courts.61
Most courts have broadly interpreted the contact sport ex-
ception to mean that a school cannot be liable for a Title IX
violation for any type of gender discrimination in a contact
sport.62 In Williams v. School District of Bethlehem, the Third
Circuit considered the issue of whether a high school boy could
be excluded from his school's field hockey team on the basis of
gender when the school offered no field hockey team for
males. 63 John Williams played intramural coeducational field
hockey as an eighth grader, but his high school only offered a
girls' field hockey team.64 John tried out for the team, earned a
tentative position as goalie, and was issued a uniform.65 How-
ever, when school officials learned that John and another boy 66
had earned positions on the team, they told the boys that they
could not play because of their gender.6 7 John's parents sued,
alleging inter alia a violation of Title IX.68
60. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,417-18 (1979).
61. See, e.g., Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 171 (3d
Cir. 1993) ("We accord [the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's]
interpretation of the regulation 'appreciable deference.'!"); Barnett v. Texas
Wrestling Ass'n, 16 F. Supp. 2d 690, 694-95 (N.D. Tex. 1998) ("The Fifth Cir-
cuit and other circuit courts of appeals have granted the regulations apprecia-
ble deference."). See generally Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (noting that an agency's interpretation
of a congressional mandate will be accepted if Congress has not clearly spoken
on the issue and the agency interpretation is reasonable).
62. See Williams, 998 F.2d at 172-74 (discussed infra); Barnett, 16 F.
Supp. 2d at 694-95 (discussed infra); cf Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496,
1503 (1996) (holding that Title IX did not require schools to allow a female
wrestler to participate on the wrestling team because wrestling is a contact
sport).
63. Williams, 998 F.2d at 168. For a more in-depth discussion of this
case, see Renee Forseth & Walter Toliver, Casenote, The Unequal Playing
Field-Exclusion of Male Athletes From Single-Sex Teams: Williams v. School
District of Bethlehem, Pa., 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 99 (1995).
64. See Williams, 998 F.2d at 170.
65. See id.
66. See id. The second boy was not a party to the action. See id. at n.1.
67. See id. at 170.
68. John's parents also alleged violations of the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal
Rights Amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution (E.R.A.), PA. CONST. art.
I, § 28. See Williams, 998 F.2d at 170.
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Although the district court found a violation of Title IX, the
Third Circuit reversed, 69 stating that the contact sport excep-
tion is "the broadest exception recognized to the overarching
goal of equal athletic opportunity."70 The court noted that Title
IX imposes a general obligation upon recipients of federal funds
to make athletic opportunities available to men and women,
but it reasoned that the law gives schools substantial flexibility
to organize their athletic programs as they see fit.71 The court
did not consider the specific wording of the contact sport excep-
tion; rather, it merely defined field hockey as a contact sport
and dismissed the claim.72
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
gave the same broad meaning to the contact sport exception in
Barnett v. Texas Wrestling Association.73 In Barnett, two fe-
male members of their high school wrestling team were denied
the opportunity to participate in mixed-gender matches at the
North Texas Open Wrestling tournament. 74 The girls brought
an action against the school, the wrestling association, and the
wrestling officials association claiming a violation of Title IX
and a § 1983 violation. 75 The district court quickly dismissed
the Title IX claim, claiming the contact sport exception "ex-
pressly permit[s] schools to sponsor sexually segregated teams,
'where selection for such tdams is based upon competitive skill
or the activity involved is a contact sport." 76 After stating this
rule, the court went no further in its analysis than to confirm
that wrestling is a contact sport77 before concluding that the
school was free to exclude the girls from the matches without
fear of Title IX liability.78 Like the Williams court, this court
did not examine the "try-out" language of the regulation or con-
69. See Williams, 998 F.2d at 169-80.
70. Id. at 172. The court stated that there was ample evidence in the rec-
ord to conclude that field hockey is a contact sport and that therefore the dis-
trict court should not have granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.
See id. at 171-72.
71. See id. at 171.
72. See id. at 174 ("If it is determined that field hockey is a contact sport,
no other inquiry is necessary because that will be dispositive of the Title IX
claim.").
73. 16 F. Supp. 2d 690 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
74. See id. at 692-93.
75. See id. at 690.
76. Id. at 694 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b)).
77. See id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) and stating that wrestling is the
quintessential contact sport).
78. See id.
20001 1667
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
sider the fact that the girls had already made the team. The
court simply and quickly concluded that there could be no Title
IX liability because the sport involved was a contact sport.
2. Section 1983 Is a Poor Alternative to Title IX
Plaintiffs who are denied Title IX relief for gender based
discrimination may still have a civil rights remedy if the dis-
criminating actor was acting under the color of state law.7 9
However, Title IX's preclusive effects and § 1983's limited ap-
plicability to public schools make the civil rights statute an un-
reliable remedy for athletes who suffer gender discrimination.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment, which provides that "[n]o state shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."80 Thus, there must be an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for the court to uphold discrimination by a state
actor on the basis of gender.81 Furthermore, courts must not
rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females. 82 Some plain-
tiffs who have been excluded from participation in a sport
based on their gender have successfully enforced their right to
play and compete through § 1983 actions. 83 However, there is
79. See id. at 695 ("The lack of a Title IX violation, however, does not
mean that the defendants' actions were in all respects lawful."). Section 1983
of Title 42 provides a statutory remedy for violations of federal statutory
rights. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 1 (1980) (holding that plaintiffs
have the ability to bring § 1983 claims predicated on federal statutory rights).
Section 1983 also provides a remedy for violations of constitutional rights
when any person acting under the color of state law deprives another of "any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994); see also Barnett, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 695 (stating that § 1983
"provides the statutory vehicle for addressing alleged violations of Fourteenth
Amendment rights"). For an analysis of state action, see generally Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. When a state actor discriminates on the
basis of gender, the state action is subject to intermediate constitutional scru-
tiny. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
81. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
82. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996).
83. See Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1503-04 (D. Kan. 1996)
(holding that although the plaintiff, who was denied the opportunity to wrestle
on her school's team, did not have a Title IX cause of action because wrestling
is a contact sport, the plaintiff did state a § 1983 claim); Force v. Pierce City R-
VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1031-32 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (dismissing plain-
tiffs Title IX claim but issuing injunction under § 1983 to secure plaintiffs
right to try out for the football team).
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dispute among courts as to whether student athletes have a
§ 1983 remedy.84 Several courts have held that § 1983 claims of
gender discrimination in an educational setting, are preempted
by Title IX.85 Thus, Title IX can preempt § 1983 and the con-
tact sport exception can preempt Title IX, leaving some student
athletes without a remedy for gender discrimination.
84. This conflict arises out of the following doctrine. The Supreme Court
has stated that where a federal statute provides a comprehensive enforcement
scheme, Congress intended to foreclose a right of action for violations of that
statute under § 1983. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1981). Sea Clammers held that congres-
sional intent to preclude constitutional claims can be gleaned from the com-
prehensive nature of the remedial devices provided in the particular act. See
id. Six years later in Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing
Authority, the Court held that a § 1983 claim would not be precluded unless a
defendant demonstrates "by express provision or other specific evidence from
the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private enforce-
ment." 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987).
The Court has also stated that when a federal statute confers a right that
is virtually identical to the constitutional right in the § 1983 claim, the § 1983
claim may be precluded by the statute if Congress intended for the statute to
provide "the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert [constitu-
tional] claims." Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984).
85. See Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 176 (3d Cir.
1993); Pfeiffer v. School Bd. for Marion Center Area, 917 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir.
1990); Nelson v. University of Maine System, 914 F. Supp. 643, 647-48 (D. Me.
1996) (holding that Title IX claims trump constitutional claims); Mann v. Uni-
versity of Cincinnati, 864 F. Supp. 44, 47-48 (S.D. Ohio 1994); Mabry v. State
Bd. for Community Colleges, 597 F. Supp. 1235, 1239 (D. Colo. 1984), affd,
863 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1987). These courts have reasoned that the compre-
hensive nature of Title IX indicates that Congress intended to foreclose addi-
tional constitutional claims. See, e.g., Nelson, 914 F. Supp. at 647-48 (holding
that remedies available under Title IX clearly establish congressional intent to
foreclose § 1983 claims). These holdings are peculiar given the Supreme
Court's holding in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
In that case, the Court refused to consider an argument that Mississippi Uni-
versity for Women was constitutionally permitted to discriminate on the basis
of gender simply because Title IX exempts institutions that have traditionally
been dedicated to single sex education. The Court held that Congress did not
have power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to "restrict, abro-
gate, or dilute these guarantees." Id. at 719 (quoting Katzenback v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966)). Rather, Section 5 enforcement powers are
"limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment."
Id. For a good discussion of this issue, see Michael A. Zwibelman, Why Title
IX Does Not Preclude Section 1983 Claims, U. CHI. L. REV. 1465 (1998).
Williams v. School District of Bethlehem is an example of a case where the
plaintiff was denied relief entirely because the contact sport exception pre-
cluded Title IX relief, and Title IX precluded recovery under § 1983. 998 F.2d
at 176 (refusing to consider the plaintiffs § 1983 claim because it is "based on
a matter fully addressed by the comprehensive scheme in Title IX.").
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Section 1983 is a potential remedy for athletes who are de-
nied the opportunity to play their sport of choice because of
their gender, but it is far from a comprehensive solution to
gender discrimination. Unfortunately, athletes who want to
participate in a sport that is limited to members of the opposite
sex are still denied equal protection of the law.86 Heather Mer-
cer's situation is a unique case in which a female athlete was
given the right to relief after suffering discrimination in the
context of a contact sport. Mercer v. Duke University is signifi-
cant because it represents the first time a court has held that
an athlete denied the right to play a contact sport because of
her 87 gender has a Title IX action.88
II. MERCER v. DUKE UNIVERSITY: A STEP TOWARD
EQUAL ATHLETIC OPPORTUNITY
Heather Mercer brought an action against Duke Univer-
sity, claiming that the football coach's actions toward her con-
stituted a violation of Title IX and state tort law.89 However,
the United States District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina initially dismissed Mercer's complaint, holding
that football is a contact sport so Duke was not required to al-
low females to play on its football team.90 The court cited the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare's Policy Inter-
pretation to support its conclusion that Title IX does not re-
quire schools "to integrate their teams nor to provide exactly
the same choice of sports to men and women."91 Mercer argued
that Duke, by allowing her to try out, scrimmage, and practice
with the team had chosen to permit mixed-gender participation
in contact sports, and having made that choice, the University
was required by Title IX to prevent discrimination against
86. See supra notes 63-78 and accompanying text (discussing Williams
and Barnett).
87. This Comment will often use the pronoun "her," but "her" should be
read as gender neutral-a short form of "her/his." As the Williams case dem-
onstrates, the contact sport exception leads to discrimination against both
male and female athletes. See Williams, 998 F.2d at 168.
88. See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 647-48 (4th Cir. 1999).
89. See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 32 F. Supp. 2d 836, 837 (M.D.N.C. 1998),
rev'd 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999); see also supra notes 1-9 and accompanying
text (describing the facts of Mercer). Mercer did not bring a § 1983 action, pre-
sumably because Duke is a private university so there is no state actor in-
volved.
90. See Mercer, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 839.
91. Id.
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her.92 The district court, however, rejected this argument, and
it cited Williams to support its conclusion that even if Duke
had previously allowed mixed-gender football, the University
was free under Title IX to change its mind and subsequently
limit the sport to members of one sex.93
On appeal from the district court's decision, the Fourth
Circuit refused to uphold this broad interpretation of the con-
tact sport exception. 94 It held that an individual who suffers
discrimination as a member of a contact sport team composed
primarily of individuals of the opposite sex does indeed have a
Title IX claim.95. The court performed an in-depth analysis of
the regulation's language96 and concluded that the more natu-
ral reading of the contact sport exception provides:
[I]n non-contact sports, but not in contact sports, covered institutions
must allow members of an excluded sex to try out for single-sex
teams. Once an institution has allowed a member of one sex to try
out for a team operated by the institution for the other sex in a con-
92. See id. at 840.
93. See id.
94. See Mercer v. Duke Univ, 190 F.3d 643, 644 (4th Cir. 1999).
95. See id. at 647-48.
96. The court began its analysis by stating that the anti-discrimination
clause and the contact sport exception of 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 "stand in a symbi-
otic relationship to one another." Mercer, 1990 F.3d at 646. The court ex-
plained that the anti-discrimination clause bars all sex discrimination, in-
cluding providing athletics separately on the basis of gender. See id. Since
this clause standing alone would require schools to integrate all their sports
teams, and radically change the dynamics of interscholastic athletics, the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare provided an exception to this
broad rule by allowing schools to provide separate teams for men and women
if the sport is a contact sport. See id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b)). In the con-
tact sport exception, the agency addresses the question of what restrictions
apply to a school that operates a team for one gender but does not offer a cor-
responding team for the other gender. See id. "[Tihe apodosis of the sentence
requires that 'members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try out for the
team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport.'" Id. at 647. The
court went on to reason that "[t]he text of this clause, on its face, is incom-
plete: it affirmatively specifies that members of the excluded sex must be al-
lowed to try out for single-sex teams where no team is provided for their sex,
but is silent regarding what requirements, if any, apply to single sex teams in
contact sports." Id. There are thus two possible interpretations of the contact
sport exception according to the court. First, "it could be read to mean that
'members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try out for the team offered
unless the sport involved is a contact sport in which case... [the anti-
discrimination clause] does not apply at all.'" Id. However, the contact sport
exception could also be read to mean that "members of the excluded sex must
be allowed to try out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact
sport, in which case members of the excluded sex need not be allowed to try
out." Id. at 647-48.
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tact sport, [the contact sport exception] is simply no longer applicable,
and the institution is subject to the [anti-discrimination clause].7
The court reasoned that the anti-discrimination clause prohib-
its all types of gender discrimination in intercollegiate athlet-
ics. 98 The language of the contact sport exception does not ex-
empt schools from that broad prohibition.99  Rather, the
exception merely states that schools need not allow members of
the excluded sex to try out for a team contact sport.100
The Fourth Circuit supported its decision by employing
several methods of statutory interpretation. The court looked
to Title IX itself to help decipher the meaning of the contact
sports exception. 1 1 It reasoned that if the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare wanted to exempt contact
sports entirely from the requirements of the anti-
discrimination clause, it certainly knew how to do so, as Con-
gress had set forth several clear exceptions in Title IX itself.102
By placing the exception to the anti-discrimination clause
where it did, the court concluded that the agency must have in-
tended for the exception to apply only to try-outs in contact
sports. 103 The court then looked to the legislative history of Ti-
tle IX to see if it supported such a reading. 0 4 The court found
this interpretation consistent with Congress's intent to "pro-
hibit discrimination in all circumstances where such discrimi-
nation is unreasonable" and to allow recipients to segregate
their athletic teams. 0 5
The court also rejected the Third Circuit's interpretation of
the contact sport exception in Williams,106 finding such a broad
97. Id. at 647-48.
98. See id. at 646.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 647; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (1994) (granting an ex-
emption to religious schools or universities if the application of the statute
would conflict with religious teachings); id. § 1681(a)(4) (granting an exemp-
tion to military educational institutions); id. § 1681(a)(5) (granting an exemp-
tion to single-sex institutions); id. § 1681(a)(6) (granting an exemption to so-
cial fraternities and sororities and voluntary youth service organizations); id.
§ 1681(a)(9) (granting an exemption to beauty pageant scholarships).
103. See Mercer, 190 F.3d at 647.
104. See id.
105. Id. "If a university chooses not to permit members of the opposite sex
to try out for a single-sex contact-sports team, this interpretation respects that
choice." Id.
106. See Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 174 (3d Cir.
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interpretation of the regulation inconsistent with the regula-
tion's language. 10 7 Where "the university invites women into
what appellees characterize as the 'traditionally all-male bas-
tion of collegiate football'... [our interpretation] is the only one
permissible under law."08 The court therefore held that Mer-
cer did state a claim upon which relief could be granted'0 9 and
remanded the case to the district court. To date, the Fourth
Circuit has been the only court to hold that an individual who
is denied the opportunity to participate in a contact sport be-
cause of her or his gender has a legitimate Title IX claim. 011
III. REMAINING PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT TEXT
OF THE CONTACT SPORT EXCEPTION
The contact sport exception to Title IX, along with the lim-
ited scope of § 1983, provide inadequate remedies to athletes
like Heather Mercer who have suffered discrimination based on
their gender. The current language of the contact sport excep-
tion is based on archaic stereotypes and thwarts the remedial
objectives of Title IX. Although the Fourth Circuit in Mercer
took great strides to narrow the exception, the discriminatory
impact of the regulations can be fully remedied only if the De-
partment of Education or Congress rewrites the regulation and
clarifies the Policy Interpretation.
1993); see also supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
107. See Mercer, 190 F.3d at 648. The Mercer court criticized the test laid
out by the William's court ("if it is determined that [a particular sport] is a
contact sport, no other inquiry is necessary because that will be dispositive of
the title IX claim'") as a "lone unexplained statement." Id. (quoting Williams,
998 F.2d at 174).
108. Id.
109. See id. ("[B]ecause appellant has alleged that Duke allowed her to try
out for its football team (and actually made her a member of the team), then
discriminated against her and ultimately excluded her from participation in
the sport on the basis of her sex, we conclude that she has stated a claim un-
der the applicable regulation.").
110. See id. ("We take to heart appellees' cautionary observation that in
[recognizing a cause of action] we thereby become the 'first Court in United
States history to recognize such a cause of action.').
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A. THE REGULATION IS A REASONABLE AGENCY
INTERPRETATION
1. Conflict Between the Text of Title IX and the Contact Sport
Exception
The current language of the contact sport exception con-
dones discrimination based on gender. Although the anti-
discrimination clause provides a broad prohibition on gender-
based discrimination in intercollegiate athletics,"' the regula-
tion's exceptions weaken its aims. In the separate teams ex-
ception, the regulation follows Congress's desire to allow
schools to segregate their teams based on gender. 112 Some
commentators argue that this "separate but equal treatment"
will never yield equal opportunity and will instead keep
women's athletics in a second-best position to men's athletics.' 3
Although this may be true, the separate teams clause at least
provides members of both genders with an opportunity to par-
ticipate in athletic contests if there is enough interest to estab-
lish separate teams. 114 However, the contact sport exception
narrows this protection. When there is not enough interest to
form two separate teams, a recipient of federal funding may
deny an individual the right to participate in her sport of
choice-not because she lacks the necessary skill, but merely
because of her gender." 5 On its face, the contact sport excep-
tion defies the stated goal of Title IX, that "[n]o person... shall
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation... [in] any
education.., activity receiving Federal financial assistance."'16
2. The Contact Sport Exception Is a Reasonable Interpretation
of Congress's Mandate and Is Unlikely To Be Overturned
Although most agency regulations that defy the purpose of
their empowering legislation can be overturned as unreason-
able agency action, it is unlikely that the courts alone could re-
peal the contact sport exception. It was not until two years af-
111. See supra text accompanying note 24 (quoting the anti-discrimination
clause).
112. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1999); see also supra note 20 (noting that
the enacting Congress did not want to desegregate football).
113. See generally Robinson, supra note 56 (arguing against sex segrega-
tion in sports).
114. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
115. See id.
116. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
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ter the passage of Title IX that Congress declared its intent for
the statute to apply to athletic programs. 117 In directing the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare to promulgate
regulations on the application of Title IX to intercollegiate
sports, Congress specified that the rules should be "reasonable
provisions considering the nature of particular sports." 18 Be-
cause this mandate presented a compromise from a more far-
reaching proposal that would have exempted all revenue-
producing intercollegiate sports from Title IX,119 it is unlikely
that a court would strike down the contact sport exception as
arbitrary and capricious. Rather, the courts will continue to
defer to the agency's interpretation, finding it reasonable. 120
Furthermore, the contact sport exception has been in force for
twenty-five years. Although this fact alone does not make it
good law, Congress's early acquiescence to the language121
seems to indicate that the agency did not overreach the
authority extended to it by Congress. Given the legislative his-
tory and Congress's expressed intent and subsequent acquies-
cence, 122 courts are likely to find that the contact sport excep-
tion is a "reasonable provision considering the nature of
particular sports."123
B. THE TEXT AND PURPOSE OF THE CONTACT SPORT EXCEPTION
CONTRADICT ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, MAKING THE
REGULATION DIFFICULT To INTERPRET
Even though courts are likely to continue upholding the
contact sport exception as a valid exercise of agency power, the
interpretation of the regulation is subject to debate because its
language is ambiguous. The regulation does not state what re-
quirements, if any, apply to single-sex teams in contact
117. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
118. Provisions Relating to Sex Discrimination, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88
Stat. 612 (1974).
119. See supra note 22.
120. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); see also text accompanying note 61. Courts have ac-
corded "appreciable deference" to the regulations promulgated under Title IX.
See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 32 F. Supp. 2d 836, 839 (M.D.N.C. 1998).
121. See supra note 23 (noting that Congress had 45 days to disapprove the
regulations but took no action).
122. See supra notes 20, 23 (describing congressional intent in passing Ti-
tle IX and congressional acceptance of the regulation).
123. Gender and Athletics Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612
(1974); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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sports. 124 It merely states that members of the excluded sex
must be allowed to try out for a single sex team in a non-
contact sport.125 As the Fourth Circuit recognized in Mercer,
this language is ambiguous and subject to two interpreta-
tions.12 6 It could be interpreted to mean that the anti-
discrimination clause does not apply to contact sports at all,
and recipients can always discriminate on the basis of gender
when a contact sport is involved. In the alternative, it could be
interpreted to imply that members of an excluded sex need not
be allowed to try out for a contact sport.127 All other instances
of gender discrimination in contact sports would still be pro-
hibited.
Mercer reasons that the latter interpretation is the correct
one, and a structural analysis of the statute supports this con-
clusion. The contact sport exception states that "members of
the excluded sex must be allowed to try out for the team offered
unless the sport involved is a contact sport."128 Unless is used
as a conjunction, tying the independent clause "members of the
excluded sex must be allowed to try out" to the condition in
which the mandate does not apply, that is when "the sport in-
volved is a contact sport."129 Because "unless the sport involved
is a contact sport" is a dependent clause, it has no meaning ex-
cept in relation to the independent clause on which it relies,
"that members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try
out."130 Under a close grammatical reading, the contact sport
provision provides only one exception, that members of one sex
need not be permitted to try out for teams composed of mem-
bers of the opposite sex if the sport involved is a contact sport.
Because the rules of statutory interpretation require that ex-
ceptions to statutes be interpreted narrowly,131 this construc-
tion of the regulation is the most appropriate.
As the Fourth Circuit remarked, this reading is reinforced
by the structure of Title IX itself. Congress clearly stated the
124. See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 646 (4th Cir. 1999).
125. See id.; see also supra note 96 (describing the Fourth Circuit's analy-
sis).
126. 190 F.3d at 647.
127. See id.
128. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1999); see also supra notes 101-05 and accom-
panying text (describing the analysis of the Fourth Circuit).
129. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Say.
Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).
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circumstances in which a recipient will be excused from the
non-discrimination requirements of Title IX.132 If the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare wanted to exempt con-
tact sports completely from the requirements of Title IX, it
could have used the clear exceptions in the statute as a model
for exemptions in the regulations. Rather, the agency chose
language that does not entirely exempt contact sports from the
purview of the statute.
Critics may argue that a study of the legislative history
undercuts the efficacy of the Fourth Circuit's structuralist ar-
gument.' 33 But, according to the commonly accepted canons of
statutory interpretation, courts should consider legislative his-
tory where the statute is ambiguous. 134 Therefore, even though
the Fourth Circuit's reading of the contact sport exception
seems to be the most reasonable textualist interpretation, the
analysis must continue. The inquiry into legislative history is
both necessary and significant because the exception is silent
as to the rights of members of an excluded sex who wish to try
out for a contact sport.
Although it was generally agreed in the 1970s that women
should be given opportunities to participate in athletics, the use
of Title IX as the mechanism to achieve that goal was hotly de-
bated. 135 Indeed, in the discussions surrounding the original
passage of the statute, members of Congress barely mentioned
athletic opportunity for women. 136 To the extent that it was
discussed, members of Congress emphasized their intent that
the legislation would not interfere with intercollegiate foot-
ball.1 37 Two years later, when Congress manifested its intent
for the statute to apply to athletics, 138 its mandate to the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare merely required
"reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular
132. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting the exemptions to
Title IX).
133. See supra note 96 (describing the structuralist arguments of the
Fourth Circuit in Mercer).
134. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610-12 n.4
(1991).
135. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting controversy over the
application of Title IX to athletics and describing the Tower Amendment).
136. See supra note 20 (noting the lack of references to athletics in the re-
ports and debates on the passage of Title IX).
137. See supra note 20 (quoting Senator Bayh, "[Nlor do I feel [Title IX]
mandates the desegregation of football fields.").
138. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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sports"'139 -not true equal athletic opportunity. Although Con-
gress apparently recognized the need to stop gender-based dis-
crimination in athletics, it did not whole-heartedly pursue such
a goal.14
The lack of congressional enthusiasm for true equal oppor-
tunity is reflected both in the contact sport exception and in
section 106.41(c) of the regulations, in which the agency states
that a funding disparity between men's and women's sports is
not determinative of a violation of the equal opportunity man-
date.1 41 The agency followed the congressional mandate by im-
plementing "reasonable provisions" 42 that increased women's
athletic opportunities. However, the regulations allow the con-
tinuation of certain discriminatory practices, such as segre-
gated contact sports and funding disparities, that many people
would have found reasonable in the mid-1970s.
The Fourth Circuit did not delve deeply into legislative his-
tory. Rather, the court summarily stated that its interpreta-
tion was consistent with the "congressional intent not to re-
quire the sexual integration of intercollegiate contact sports"
but to "prohibit discrimination in all circumstances where such
discrimination is unreasonable." 143 Although the Fourth Cir-
cuit's conclusion that the legislative history supported its in-
terpretation of the statute'" is true to an extent, the court's
analysis is somewhat incomplete. The court reasoned that its
interpretation does not defy congressional intent because it
continues to give recipients the opportunity to prohibit mem-
bers of the excluded sex from trying out for a single-sex team.145
However, this interpretation ignores the hostility many mem-
bers of Congress expressed toward passing any legislation that
could harm or change intercollegiate football. 46 Indeed, Duke's
defensive reference to the "traditionally all-male bastion of col-
139. Gender and Athletics Act, Educational Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612 (1974); see also supra note 22 and accompany-
ing text.
140. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
14L See supra note 26 and accompanying text (quoting the regulation's
provision on funding of sports).
142. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
143. Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).
144. See supra text accompanying note 105.
145. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 20-22 (noting the conflict over equal athletic opportu-
nity).
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legiate football"147 is probably somewhat more consistent with
the intent of the enacting Congress.
This legislative history injures some of the Fourth Circuit's
otherwise solid analysis. One of the court's strongest state-
ments-that the Williams court's holding that the involvement
of a contact sport is dispositive of the Title IX claim 148 is a
"lone unexplained statement" that is "inconsistent with the
language of the regulation,"149 -is not completely justified. Al-
though the Fourth Circuit is correct that the text does not ad-
vocate such a broad interpretation, the legislative history sug-
gests that this could have been Congress's intent.150 Given the
enacting Congress's concern for the preservation of football, the
broad interpretation of the contact sport exception in Wil-
liams,'5' Barnette,152 and the district court's decision in Mer-
cer 153 does have a foundation, albeit a weak one.
However, a complete analysis of the regulation cannot stop
there. The contradiction between the text of the contact sport
exception and the legislative history of Title IX warrant the
consideration of the purpose 154 of Title IX and of current public
values. 155 The Supreme Court has stated that remedial stat-
utes, in particular, should be interpreted broadly to effectuate
their purpose. 156 The key mandate of Title IX provides for an
147. Mercer, 190 F.3d at 643; see also text accompanying note 108.
148. See supra note 107.
149. Mercer, 190 F.3d at 648.
150. Because Congress rejected the Tower Amendment and accepted the
"reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports" language, it
can be assumed that it was not Congress's intent to exempt all revenue pro-
ducing sports. However, the "reasonable provision" language was a compro-
mise to supporters of the Tower Amendment, neither exempting football nor
requiring many of the sacrifices inherent in providing true equal opportunity
in athletics.
151. Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 172 (3d Cir.
1993); see also notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
152. Barnette v. Texas Wrestling Ass'n, 16 F. Supp. 2d 690, 694-95 (N.D.
Tex. 1998); see also supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
153. Mercer v. Duke Univ., 32 F. Supp. 2d 836, 838-39 (M.D.N.C. 1998); see
also notes 89-93 and accompanying text (describing the district court opinion).
154. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst &Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60-61 (1990).
155. For a good description of the process of statutory interpretation, see
generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpreta-
tion as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) (stating that ambigu-
ous statutes should be interpreted in the manner that best carries out their
purpose).
156. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557,
562 (1987).
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end to gender-based discrimination in educational programs
and activities.1 57 Moreover, it is clear from the passage of the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987-and the strong majority
that supported it-that Congress expected Title IX to provide
equal athletic opportunity for both genders. 158 Indeed, al-
though Title IX is designed to apply generally to all gender dis-
crimination in educational institutions, "women's athletics have
become the touchstone for Title IX's effectiveness.' 59
Current congressional debate further indicates that Con-
gress expects Title IX to further the goal of decreasing gender
barriers to athletic participation. In 1994, Congress passed the
Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act to assure that female stu-
dents could pick schools that provide equal athletic opportu-
nity. 60 Furthermore, the failure of House Speaker Hastert's
proposal to amend Title IX to protect men's sports and to cut
funding for enforcement of the law demonstrates that the cur-
rent Congress does not share the hesitations and biases of the
enacting Congress. 161 Hastert, like Senator Tower in 1974,162
wanted to protect men's sports from the effect of Title IX, but
his proposal was defeated by an overwhelming majority of 292-
129.163 The majority's clear unwillingness to endanger Title
TX's efficacy demonstrates strong support for continuing the
fight against gender discrimination in athletics.1 4 Congress's
salutations to the 1999 U.S. Women's World Cup Champion-
ship Team-not to mention its recognition that Title IX helped
to bring about such a victory-further confirm current legisla-
157. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994); see also 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (daily ed.
Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (stating that "the heart of [Title IX] is
a provision banning sex discrimination in educational programs receiving
Federal funds"). In introducing the measure, Senator Bayh stated that, "a
strong and comprehensive measure is needed to provide women with solid le-
gal protection from the persistent, pernicious discrimination which is serving
to perpetuate second-class citizenship for American women." 118 CONG. REC.
at 5804.
158. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
159. Mark Hankerson, Courts Have Extended Sex Bias Law's Reach, 57
CONG. Q. WKLY. 747, 747 (1999).
160. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
161. See Koszczuk, supra note 42, at 745-47.
162. See supra note 22 (noting Senator Tower's attempt to pass an amend-
ment to exempt all men's revenue-producing sports from the requirements of
Title IX).
163. See Koszczuk, supra note 42, at 746.
164. See id. (noting "[tihe attitude was, if men's sports are dropped, that's
tough." (comments of Rep. McKeon)).
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tive support for equal opportunity in athletics. 16 5 Equal ath-
letic opportunity for women athletes is a clear goal of the cur-
rent Congress, and given the ambiguity of the contact sport ex-
ception, the regulation should be interpreted to best reflect this
public policy goal.
The interpretation of the contact sport exception in Wil-
liams and Barnette, which allows a recipient of federal funds to
discriminate based on gender simply because the sport involved
is a contact sport, contravenes the goal of Title IX and the
strong congressional and public support for women's athletics.
Title IX prohibits gender-based discrimination and Congress
strongly supports that prohibition. Therefore, the Fourth Cir-
cuit's interpretation in Mercer, which protects victims of gender
discrimination by granting the plaintiff a Title IX cause of ac-
tion, best effectuates the purpose of Title IX.
C. WEAKNESSES IN THE BEST INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONTACT SPORT EXCEPTION
Because the Fourth Circuit's interpretation provides the
most logical textualist reading of the regulation 166 and better
accomplishes the purpose of Title IX, it is the superior interpre-
tation of the contact sport exception. Unfortunately, the appli-
cation of this reading provides perverse incentives to the recipi-
ents of Title IX funding. Under the Fourth Circuit's analysis, a
recipient of federal funding can escape liability under Title IX
by simply not allowing members of the excluded sex to try out
for contact sports. 67 Many schools and colleges have gone be-
yond the requirements of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare's regulations and have allowed members of an ex-
cluded sex to try out for a team in a contact sport composed of
members of the opposite sex.168 Indeed, several courts hearing
165. See 145 CONG. REC. S8205-06 (daily ed. July 12, 1999) (statement of
Sen. Reid); Sen. Res. 141, 106th Cong., 145 CONG. REC. 8648-49 (1999) (To
Congratulate the United States Women's Soccer Team on Winning the 1999
Women's World Cup Championship).
166. See discussion supra Part H.B.
167. See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 647-48 (4th Cir. 1999).
168. See, e.g., Barnette v. Texas Wrestling Ass'n, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 690, 692
(N.D. Tex. 1998) (recounting that the female plaintiffs were members of their
respective high school wrestling teams); Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496,
1500 (D. Kan. 1996) (noting that evidence was presented demonstrating that
800 girls participate in competitive wrestling in the United States); Force v.
Pierce City R-VI Sch. Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020, 1023-25 (W.D. Mo. 1983)
(holding that under the Equal Protection Clause, a school must allow a female
168120001
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§ 1983 actions have held that the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires public schools to go beyond the requirements of the con-
tact sport exception. 169 However, the Fourth Circuit's reading
of the exception indirectly encourages private schools and col-
leges, which are not bound by the Fourteenth Amendment, to
prevent members of an excluded sex from trying out for a team
in a contact sport.
If private schools or colleges open try-outs to members of
an excluded sex, they are subject to the full requirements of the
anti-discrimination clause.170 That clause requires, among
other things, that no athlete shall be treated differently from
other athletes because of gender.' 71 Therefore, a recipient that
opened single-sex teams to members of the opposite sex but
wanted to retain some gender-based distinctions could subject
itself to Title IX liability and damages. The surest way for a
recipient to avoid Title IX litigation is to prevent members of
the opposite sex from trying out for a contact sport.
A hypothetical situation similar to the facts in Barnette172
demonstrates the disincentive created by such an interpreta-
tion. Today, over 800 girls participate in competitive wrestling
in the United States. 173 Many are able to do so because the
school has made the opportunity available to them. 74 Consider
these facts: if a private school recognized the interest of female
students in wrestling, did not have enough females to form a
separate team, and did not want female students wrestling
male students, it has one option-deny females the right to try
out. It could not adopt an incremental solution, such as per-
mitting females to try out for the team, practice with the team,
but compete solely against other female wrestlers, without ex-
posing itself to liability. 175 Although this incremental solution
to try out for a contact sport unless the school provides an important govern-
ment objective for the classification).
169. See Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1505 (finding no substantial government
interest warranting a school's decision to prevent a female plaintiff from try-
ing out for the wrestling team); Force, 570 F. Supp. at 1031 (finding no impor-
tant government interest to warrant denying a female plaintiff the opportu-
nity to try out for the school football team).
170. See Mercer, 190 F.3d at 647.
171. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (1999) ("No person shall, on the basis of
sex .... be treated differently from another person... [in] athletics offered by
a recipient....").
172. See Barnette, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 692-93.
173. See Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1500 (recounting the findings of fact).
174. See id; see also Barnette, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
175. The author does not endorse such a policy, but merely suggests it may
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is not the policy goal advocated by this Comment, 7 6 it does give
more female students the ability to participate. Furthermore,
it eventually may produce enough interest to form a separate
team for female students, thereby increasing athletic opportu-
nities.'"7 It is contrary to public support of women's athletics
for the federal government to provide such disincentives to
athletic participation and program development.' 78 It is also
inconsistent for the contact sport exception to permit gender-
based discrimination that is unconstitutional under the Four-
teenth Amendment 79 Consequently, the only solution to the
ambiguous language and the discriminatory results of the con-
tact sport exception is to change its wording.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE CONTACT SPORT
EXCEPTION TO ENSURE EQUAL ATHLETIC
OPPORTUNITY
The disincentives created by the contact sport exception
can be eradicated if Congress or the Department of Education
be preferable to completely denying the right to participate on an athletic
team.
176. This Comment does not endorse such a policy because it continues to
discriminate on the basis of gender. Indeed, if a public school instituted such
a policy, it might violate the Equal Protection Clause. One court has already
found that such discrimination, undertaken by a state school, violates the
equal protection clause. See Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1504. The Adams court
stated that a school policy denying female wrestlers the opportunity to wrestle
members of the opposite sex is not substantially related to the goals of avoid-
ing sexual harassment litigation ("A school district best avoids sexual harass-
ment litigation by acting to prevent sexual harassment rather than excluding
females from participating in activities."), increasing student safety (female
students are no more likely to become injured than male students), or avoiding
disruption of the school setting. See id.; see also discussion supra Part I.B.2.
However, the suggested situation involves a private school that would not be
subject to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, sev-
eral courts have held that § 1983 claims are precluded by Title IX. See supra
note 85 and accompanying text. In these jurisdictions, if the Title IX claim
against a public school is dismissed, the plaintiff does not have a § 1983 claim.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
One can imagine that the arguments against mixed-gender wrestling are
likely to be more persuasive to a school board or principal than they were to
the Adams court. Therefore, given the option of requiring mixed-gender wres-
tling or preventing female participation on the team, many recipients, sadly,
are more likely to choose the latter option.
177. As more female students are given opportunities to compete, they may
encourage other females to try the sport.
178. See generally supra Part III.C.
179. See supra Part I.B.2 (recalling Fourteenth Amendment case law on
gender discrimination).
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revises the regulation. The Department of Education could
delete the contact sport exception and let the regulation read as
follows: "where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a
particular sport for members of one sex but operates or spon-
sors no such team for members of the other sex, ... members of
the excluded sex must be allowed to try out for the team of-
fered." 80 To help institutions and the courts better understand
this language, the Department of Education should also revise
the Policy Interpretation. The language relied upon by the dis-
trict court in Mercer-that Title IX does not require schools "to
integrate their teams nor to provide the same choice of sports to
men and women"181-should be deleted. In its place, new text
should convey that every student at a school, regardless of gen-
der, should have the opportunity to try out for any sport offered
by the school. Selection for the team may then be made ac-
cording to an athlete's skills but not according to gender. The
interpretation should also include, among its factors and stan-
dards, 8 2 that try-outs must be open to members of both gen-
ders when only one team is offered in a sport.
Several public policy goals would be accomplished by these
revisions. First, such a regulation would mandate non-
discrimination. It would not only rid the regulation of the cur-
rent disincentive to letting members of an excluded sex try out
for a single-sex team, but it would also require that members of
both genders be allowed to try out for a sport even though only
one team is offered. Second, it would acknowledge a more en-
lightened view of gender-based differences as they pertain to
athletics. The stereotypical belief that men are better athletes
than women does not always hold true when comparing two in-
dividuals,183 and may not be true as a generalization. Under
the current version of the regulations, a talented athlete may
be denied an athletic opportunity simply because of her gender.
Under a revised version of the regulation, however, the ath-
180. Cf 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1999) (deleting the language "unless the
sport involved is a contact sport").
181. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 30 (noting that the Policy Interpretation sets out sev-
eral factors and standards).
183. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996) (stating that
"generalizations about 'the way women are,' estimates of what is appropriate
for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose talent
and capacity place them outside the average description"); see also supra note
1 and accompanying text (noting that Heather Mercer's kicking skills were
better than those of many men).
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lete's ability to compete would depend on individual skill rather
than pre-conceived notions of what that skill can be.
One potential criticism of this regulation is that its man-
date of equal opportunity would apply equally to males and fe-
males. Therefore, males would be allowed to play on teams
composed of females if the institution did not offer a corre-
sponding team for males. Although this is a fair, neutral pol-
icy, many fear that male participation on female teams may
have the effect of diluting the athletic opportunities of fe-
males. 8 4 Fears that the participation of male athletes on fe-
male teams will significantly decrease female opportunities,
however, are for the most part unfounded. First, many schools
already offer separate teams in popular sports.185 Under the
new regulation, men would not be allowed to try out for a
women's team if there was a men's team available. Second, Ti-
tle IX case law still requires that the number of females par-
ticipating in athletics be substantially proportionate to the
number of females enrolled in an institution.186 Institutions
must continue to retain this substantial proportionality. If a
glut of males try out for and make the female field hockey or
volleyball team, the institution will be forced to create separate
teams, thereby increasing net athletic opportunities.
The new language in the regulation has further benefits-
it acknowledges that contact between men and women in the
course of athletic competition is no different than contact be-
tween two members of the same sex. It is unclear why the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare decided to distin-
guish between contact sports and non-contact sports. Two
possible explanations include concerns about safety and con-
cerns about sexual contact. 187 Contact sports, like all sports,
involve a risk of injury. However, the view that women should
receive greater protection from injury is ill-founded-women
184. See Robinson, supra note 56, at 323 (noting that women support "sex
segregated sports for several different reasons. Women may fear... that if
girls teams are replete with boys then fewer opportunities for girls exist; and
that if total integration occurred, girls teams would disappear.").
185. Many schools offer men's and women's tennis, swimming, basketball,
track, cross-country, and golf, to name a few.
186. See supra note 41 (discussing recent cases where courts have held that
there should be proportional representation of men and women athletes in
school athletic programs).
187. See, e.g., Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D. Kan. 1996) (dis-
cussing the defendant's offered defenses for segregated wrestling team, in-
cluding safety concerns and fear of sexual harassment litigation).
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are no more likely to become injured in a contact sport than
men.188 Although it is true that, in absolute terms, men are
generally stronger and bigger than women, 189 these average
physiological differences do not justify the incorporation of
group stereotypes into the law.
In other legal areas, courts and the government have re-
jected the use of gender stereotypes as a justification for dis-
crimination. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
for example, has rejected the use of group gender stereotypes as
an employment qualification. 190 If a job requires heavy lifting,
an employer can require that applicants be able to lift fifty
pounds but cannot confine the search solely to men because it is
perceives that women cannot do heavy lifting.191 Likewise, the
Court employs intermediate scrutiny to the use of gender
stereotypes in Fourteenth Amendment cases. 192 State policies
that deny equal opportunity to women "simply because they are
women" are unconstitutional. 193 Further, the rationale that
women are more susceptible to injury because of their size is
used inconsistently. Schools and universities do not prevent
smaller males from trying out for contact sports in order to pro-
tect them. Rather, the try-out is based on competitive skill,
and the athlete who is selected assumes the risk that his size
may make him more susceptible to injuries. Under the pro-
posed language of the regulation, selection is still based on
competitive skill so that only members of the opposite gender
who are able to compete can play. Similarly, when an athlete
of a minority sex on a team agrees to play, she assumes the risk
of the athletic injuries to which her size may make her more
susceptible.
188. See id.
189. See, e.g., William P. Ebben & Randall L. Jensen, Strength Training for
Women: Debunking Myths That Block Opportunity, 26 PHYsIcIAN & SPORTS
MED., May 1998, at 86, 88 (noting that "the average American male is about
13 cm taller than the average female and about 18 kg heavier" and that
"women possess about two thirds the strength of men.").
190. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (1999) (stating that the use of gen-
der stereotypes as justifications for gender discrimination are not protected by
exceptions to Title VII and that the statute requires that "individuals be con-
sidered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any char-
acteristics generally attributed to the group.").
191. See id.
192. See supra notes 10, 80-82 and accompanying text (examining Four-
teenth Amendment case law).
193. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996); see also supra note
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The fear of sexual contact is also unjustified. Athletic con-
tact is not sexual contact nor should it be perceived as such. An
athlete who perceives normal contact in the course of athletic
competition to be sexual contact should not play. Likewise, a
student who fails to act maturely in such a situation should be
denied the opportunity to participate. 94 Although this system
would require more awareness and regulation by coaches, it
allows schools to avoid peer sexual harassment litigation with-
out denying half the school's population the opportunity to par-
ticipate in a sport. 195
Finally, the new regulation would resolve the conflict be-
tween the contact sport exception and § 1983 actions. Situa-
tions in which the plaintiff is denied all federal relief because
the contact sport exception prevents Title IX relief and Title IX
precludes a § 1983 action 196 would disappear because the regu-
lation would mandate equal treatment. The new regulation
would require the same type of non-discrimination that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires in all state laws. 197 Further-
more, all student athletes at recipient institutions, whether at-
tending public or private schools, would be entitled to relief.198
Therefore, plaintiffs like Heather Mercer who are victims of
gender discrimination at private institutions would be guaran-
teed a federal cause of action.
CONCLUSION
There are several problems with the current text of the Ti-
tle IX regulations on athletics. As the Mercer court expressed,
the contact sport exception presents unclear direction regard-
ing how courts should deal with the case of an athlete who has
194. See, e.g., Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D. Kan. 1996)
(reasoning that "[a] school district best avoids sexual harassment litigation by
acting to prevent sexual harassment rather than excluding females from par-
ticipating in activities").
195. See id. at 1504-05.
196. See Williams v. School Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 176 (3d Cir.
1993); see also supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing possible
preclusion of § 1983 claims by Title IX).
197. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (examining require-
ments of Fourteenth Amendment).
198. Because Title IX was enacted under the congressional spending
power, all institutions that receive funding must comply. See supra text ac-
companying notes 18-19. Section 1983, on the other hand, depends on con-
gressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent the states
from denying equal protection of the law. See supra notes 80 and accompa-
nying text.
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been denied the opportunity to play a sport because of her gen-
der. The language of the exception is ambiguous and confus-
ing. Furthermore, an analysis of Mercer demonstrates that the
purposivist and textualist interpretations contradict the inter-
pretation based on legislative history. Finally, even the most
favorable interpretation of the contact sport exception encour-
ages recipients of federal funds to deny athletes the right to try
out for a team solely on the basis of gender. Such results are
inconsistent with congressional and public support for equal
athletic opportunity and fail to fulfill the mandate of Title IX.
In order to combat gender-based discrimination in athletics
and to achieve congressional and public goals of equal athletic
opportunity, the language of the regulation must be changed.
Deleting the contact sport exception would provide athletes
with opportunities to play and compete based on their ability,
not their gender. Furthermore, a new Policy Interpretation,
clarifying the regulation's intent to make athletic participation
dependent on skill rather than gender would ensure that the
courts and recipients understand the new language. Such
changes would give athletes like Heather Mercer the opportu-
nity to compete and would reflect the realization that men and
women should be able to pursue their individual goals free from
gender-based restraints.
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